Abstract-Resilient monitoring systems, considered in this paper, are sensor networks that degrade gracefully under malicious attacks on their sensors, causing them to project misleading information. The goal of this paper is to design, analyze, and evaluate the performance of a resilient monitoring system intended to monitor plant conditions (normal or anomalous). The architecture developed consists of four layers: data quality assessment, process variable assessment, plant condition assessment, and sensor network adaptation. Each of these layers is analyzed by either analytical or numerical tools. The performance of the overall system is evaluated using a simplified boiler/turbine plant. The measure of resiliency is quantified based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence and shown to be sufficiently high in all scenarios considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper is devoted to the design, analysis, and performance evaluation of an autonomous decentralized monitoring system that degrades gracefully under malicious attacks on its sensors. We refer to such a system as resilient.
The sensor network addressed in this paper is intended to measure process variables, e.g., temperature, pressure, flow rate, etc., at various parts of a plant (e.g., power plant), and assess the plant's condition (e.g., normal or anomalous). When sensors are under attack, the sensor network must restructure itself, either by reassigning some sensors or discounting measurements of others, or both, so that the best plant condition assessment is ascertained.
If the sensor malfunctioning were statistical, e.g., only the variance of the sensor measurement were maliciously changed, numerous statistical tools could be applied to evaluate the process variables and use them for plant assessment and subsequent sensor network adaptation. We assume, however, that the attacker may force a sensor to project misleading data, i.e., data, which are statistically unrelated to the process variable, and characterize the level of discrepancy by a scalar parameter, referred to as data quality, DQ ∈ [0, 1], where DQ = 1 and DQ = 0 imply, respectively, that the sensor is totally trustworthy and not trustworthy at all. All other values of DQ represent various levels of trustworthiness. For DQ < 1, statistical methods are insufficient for process variable assessment, and, therefore, models of the attacker and the effect of DQ on process variable identification must be introduced. This leads to a four-layer resilient monitoring system architecture, shown in Fig. 1 . In this figure, G and SN are the monitored plant and the sensor network, which may be under physical and cyber attack, respectively. The remaining four blocks represent the monitoring system. Specifically, DQ denotes the data quality assessment layer;P x (V) and P x (G) are the two layers, where the probability mass functions (PMFs) of process variable,P x (V), and plant conditions, P x (G), are assessed, when the sensor network is in state x; and adapt represents the adaptation layer intended to adapt the sensor network to a state, where the entropy ofP x (G), i.e., the uncertainty of plant assessment, is minimized. The techniques utilized at each of these layers are described in details in this paper, along with their application to the boiler/turbine plant.
Although resilience is a relatively new research topic, the literature in this area is growing rapidly. It can be classified into four groups. The first one is devoted to foundational issues, where the problems of resilient monitoring and control are motivated and formulated [1] - [5] . The second group includes publications on control-theoretic methods for attack identification and alleviation, [6] - [8] . Here, the attack is typically modeled as a disturbance, and criteria of its identifiability and alleviation are developed. The third group consists of publications on fault tolerant control [9] - [11] . In these works, it is assumed that a closed-loop system has multiple sensors and actuators, and the problem is to determine the conditions (e.g., the number of sensors and actuators) under which the closed-loop system performance is maintained. Finally, the fourth group consists of research on monitoring wireless communication channels in order to capture anomalous traffic and correlate it with a possible attack [12] - [14] . While these publications report impressive developments, the problem of resilient plant monitoring under cyber attacks on its sensors remains open. This paper is intended to address this problem.
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Our preliminary results have been reported in conference presentations [15] - [19] . In this paper, we extend these results and apply them to a boiler/turbine system.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section II is devoted to modeling issues and problem formulation. The four layers mentioned above are described in Sections III-VI, respectively. An application to a boiler/turbine system is reported in Section VII. Finally, the conclusions and directions of future work are given in Section VIII. The proofs are included in the Appendix.
II. MODELING AND PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
This section presents models of all components of the resilient monitoring system addressed in this paper, namely, process variables, sensors, attacker, plant, and sensor network. In addition, it describes problems addressed in the design and analysis of all the four layers of the monitoring system architecture. Finally, it introduces a measure of resiliency, which quantifies the efficacy of monitoring systems under malicious attacks.
A. Process Variable 1) Model:
Let V denote a process variable, andṼ be a continuous random variable that represents the values it takes according to the probability density function (PDF) fṼ (ṽ). In operations, process variables are often characterized as being normal or anomalous. While in Section VII we consider specific anomalous states related to the boiler/turbine system, Sections II-VI treat generic anomalies, referred to as low and high. To model this situation, introduce a discrete random variable V with outcomes Low (L), Normal (N), and High (H) defined by the following probabilities:
where V min and V max are the minimum and maximum values of V, respectively, and R 1 and R 2 are defined by technological considerations so that V min < R 1 < R 2 < V max . Thus, V is represented by a discrete random variable, V, with the universal set
and the PMF, P(V), given in (1). 
can be used to characterize the behavior of V in regions L, N, and H. Thus, the model of a process variable is defined by the PDF ofṼ, PMF of V, and the DC gains α L , α N , and α H .
B. Sensor 1) Model:
Let S be a sensor assigned to monitor process variable V, andS a continuous random variable representing its projected data; the PDF ofS is denoted as fS(s). As in the case of the process variable, the sensor measurements can be represented by a discrete random variable, S, with the outcomes Low (L), Normal (N), or High (H), and the PMF, P(S), defined by
where R 1 and R 2 are the same as in (1) . Thus, S has the same universal set as V, but possibly a different PMF [given by (4) ]. The PMFs P(V) and P(S), may differ due to natural or malicious causes. For example, they may have different variances and/or expected values. As mentioned in Section I, we quantify the measure of discrepancy between P(V) and P(S) by DQ ∈ [0, 1]. While the issue of DQ assignment is addressed in Section III, we use it below to further define the sensor model.
Since DQ is not a statistical quantity, a model of its effect on the relationship between random variables V and S should be introduced. To accomplish this, define the quantity
referred to as the sensor believability. When DQ is close to 1, B is also close to 1; when DQ is close to 0, B is close to 1 3 , implying that each outcome of V is equally plausible. Using the believability, we define the conditional PMF of V given S as follows:
whereσ denotes "not σ " and σ,σ ∈ [defined in (2) ]. Clearly, this implies that V has the same outcome as S with probability B, and two other outcomes with equal probabilities.
Note that when the cardinality of , i.e., | |, is not 3, B is defined by
and (6) is modified as
These expressions are used in Section VII for the boiler/turbine plant. Thus, the model of a sensor is defined by the PDF ofS, PMF of S, data quality DQ, believability B, and the coupling (6) .
2) Problems: 1) Based on the models of the process variable and the sensor introduced above, develop a method for DQ assignment. This is carried out in Section III. 2) Given the sensor measurements s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , ... and its data quality DQ, develop a method for calculating an estimate of P(V), denoted asP(V), and specified by
3) If multiple sensors, e.g., S 1 and S 2 , monitor a process variable V, develop a method to identify
This and the previous problem are considered in Section IV.
C. Attacker 1) Model:
The attacker modifies sensor measurements in order to project misleading information. In formal terms, this implies that the attacker modifies fS(s) by changing its variance or expected value, or both. Our preliminary investigation indicates that modifying expected values is more damaging for resilient monitoring than modifying variances. Therefore, the model of the attacker considered in this paper is that for a sensor under attack
where E[.] denotes the expected value. This implies, for example, that, while process variable V is in state N, sensor S may project a signal indicating that V is in state H or L. The attacker model (11) is considered throughout this paper. In particular, it is used in Section III for data quality identification. We note, however, that other models of the attacker could be considered using the approach developed here.
D. Plant 1) Model:
Let G denote the monitored plant, and G be the discrete random variable representing its condition, which can be either Normal (N G ) or Anomalous (A 1G , A 2G , . . . , A kG ). However, to make the presentation more transparent, we assume that the anomalous conditions of the plant are analogous to those of the process variables, i.e., Low (L G ) and High (H G ). Thus, the universal set of G is
As far as the plant model is concerned, we assume that in the case of a single process variable it is specified by the conditional PMF of V given G, i.e.,
In the case of multiple process variables, V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V M , the plant model is given either by a vector of conditional PMFs
or by a joint conditional PMF
2) Problem: In the case of a single process variable monitored by a single or multiple sensors, given conditional PMF(s) (9) [or (9) and (10)] and the plant model (13) , estimate the PMF of the plant state,P(G), G ∈ G . In the case of M > 1 process variables,P(G) must be identified based on either plant models (14) or (15) (G = σ ) , σ ∈ G , be the estimate of the plant PMF when the network is in state x, and letÎ x (G) be the entropy of this PMF
where the log-base 3 is selected because | G | = 3. Clearly, I x (G) quantifies the measure of uncertainty in the plant assessment − the smallerÎ x (G), the more certain the assessment is. UsingÎ x (G), the problem of resilient monitoring can be defined as follows.
2) Problem: Autonomously (i.e., without any external supervision) and in a decentralized manner (i.e., without communication among the sensors) determine the state of the network at whichÎ x (G) is minimized, i.e., find x * ∈ X such thatÎ
and have the network operate in this state with the largest probability. An approach to solving this problem is outlined next.
F. Adaptation and Measure of Resiliency

1) Model:
As mentioned above, the decisions to be made with regard to the sensors, in the context of resilient monitoring, is whether to use their measurements for PMFs (9) and (10) identification or not. In this paper, these decisions are made by the so-called rational controllers.
The theory of rational behavior and rational controllers has been developed in [20] and further extended in [21] and [22] . While the properties and behavior of rational controllers are described in Section VI, we note here that they are used in the current work to force the network to operate in the state x * (i.e., the state resulting in the smallest entropy,Î x * (G)) with the largest probability.
To characterize the efficacy of this adaptation procedure, we introduce the notion of measure of resiliency. LetP x (G) be the estimate of the plant PMF when the sensor network is in state x ∈ X. Let the probability of the network operating in state x be τ x . Then, introduce the expected value ofP x (G), x ∈ X, given byP
To quantify the measure of resiliency, we utilize the distance ofP(G) from the true PMF of the plant, P(G). This is accomplished based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence [23] 
Using this expression, the measure of resiliency, MR, is introduced as follows:
whereP nr (G) is the estimated plant PMF of the nonresilient system, i.e., when the monitoring system operates assuming that DQ i = 1, ∀i, and all sensors are utilized continuously. Clearly, MR ≤ 1, and the value 1 is attained whenP(G) = P(G). Based on the above, we formulate the following resilient adaptation problems.
2) Problems: 1) Design the structure and select the parameters of rational controllers appropriate for the resilient monitoring system. 2) For the system, thus designed, evaluate its performance as quantified by the measure of resiliency (20) . The first of these problems is solved in Section VI and the second in Section VII.
III. DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT LAYER
A. Approach
In the case of the mean-based attacker introduced in Section II-C, it could happen that a compromised sensor produces more self-consistent data (i.e., data with smaller entropy) than noncompromised ones. Since the resilient monitoring system uses entropy to quantify desirable sensor network states, this may lead to erroneous decisions as to which sensors should and which should not be taken into account. Clearly, this problem cannot be avoided by using traditional statistical tools, and nonstatistical methods are necessary. In this paper, this is accomplished using an active identification procedure based on probing tests. According to this procedure, the process variable is probed by a rectangular signal, and the observed sensor response is analyzed from the point of view of its consistency with the DC gains of the process variable, introduced in (3). Sensors with larger consistency are viewed as more trustworthy, and their DQ is assigned accordingly. This is the approach to DQ assignment developed in this section, under the assumption that DQ is constant during the probe and the subsequent process variable PMF assessment.
B. Probing Signal
In general, any type of deterministic or random probing signals could be used. We utilize here the simplest probe − a rectangular pulse with amplitude A 0 and duration T, applied at the time instant t 0
The value of A 0 is selected sufficiently small so that the process variable remains in the same state (L, N, or H) before and during the probe. The value of T should be selected so that the process variable reaches a small vicinity of its steady state defined by the probe and sufficient data is collected for DQ computation.
C. Probing Inconsistency
where N S is the number of sensors monitoring a given process variable V. Further, let the mean value, E[S i ], of the measurements of sensor S i before the probe be μS i , and at the end of the probe be μ S i . Clearly, the difference between these two values should be equal to the DC gain of the process variable, which corresponds to its region (i.e., L, N, or H), multiplied by the amplitude of the probe
where
So, if a sensor is not attacked, the quantity (
is zero. If a sensor is attacked, it may be large. To discriminate between these two situations, we introduce the notion of probing inconsistency (PIC) of sensor, S i , as follows:
) is given in (23) . When the attacker, being unaware of the probe, maintains the same average values of its signals before and during the probe,
). When the attacker is anticipating the probe, but does not exactly know (A 0 , t 0 ) and (α L , α N , α H ), PIC i again can be large. Only when the attacker is anticipating the probe and knows the above quantities exactly, PIC i is small, and, thus, a sensor under attack may erroneously be recognized as a nonattacked one. To prevent this, a random A 0 and t 0 can be used for each probing signal, although, in this paper, we do not address the issue of anticipating attackers with complete knowledge of the probe and DC gains.
D. Data Quality Assignment
While various functions of PIC i could be used for DQ i assignment (see [16] ), in this paper we assign it according to (25) where F(PIC i ) is a nonnegative monotonically increasing function of PIC i . Again, various types of such functions may be utilized. Our preliminary investigation indicates that a good choice of F(PIC i ) is
Selecting an appropriate value of γ i is of importance. Indeed, if this constant were too small, even sensors with large PIC i would have relatively large DQ i , which is undesirable; if it is too large, even sensors with small PIC i would have relatively small DQ i . Thus, this constant should be selected so that the largest PIC i , denoted by PIC M i , results in the smallest DQ i , which is a design parameter. If this parameter is selected as << 1, the considerations based on (25) and (26) lead to the following γ i :
Equations (21)- (28) constitute the data quality assignment layer of the resilient monitoring system designed in this paper.
E. Example
Consider a process variable V, which is monitored by two sensors S 1 and S 2 . Assume thatṼ andS i , i ∈ {1, 2}, are Gaussian random variables, whose distributions are specified by
), respectively, with the standard deviations being sufficiently small relative to the interval [V min , V max ]. Therefore, realizations ofṼ andS i outside this interval occur with a small probability, and may be ignored. For this example, select V min = 0, V max = 10, μṼ = 9.5, μS 1 = 2, μS 2 = 9, σṼ = 10 −3 , and σS
, and [R 2 , V max ] represent the sets whereṼ andS i are viewed as L, N, and H, respectively, with R 1 = 10/3 and R 2 = 20/3. Then, the PMFs of V and S i are given by the row vectors
Assume that the process variable DC gains are α L = 2, α N = 1.8, α H = 1.62, and the probing signal is selected as
Note that in the simple scenario of this example, the probe's starting time and its duration do not play any role and are shown only for completeness. Finally, let the parameter , involved in (27), be 0.02.
In this scenario, PIC 1 is calculated, using (24) , as |A 0 (α H − α L )| = 0.038, which, incidentally, equals PIC M 1 [see second row of (28)]. Therefore, according to (25) -(27), DQ 1 = 0.02. Next, PIC 2 is calculated, again using (24), as |A 0 (α H −α H )| = 0. Therefore, from (25)- (27), we obtain DQ 2 = 1. Note that if μS 1 were equal to 6, then DQ 1 = 0.4.
IV. PROCESS VARIABLE ASSESSMENT LAYER
As indicated in Section II-B, the purpose of this layer is calculatingP(V), i.e., the estimate of P(V) based on sensor measurements s 1 , . . . , s n , . . . and its data quality, DQ [see (9) ]. Below, we first carry this out for a single sensor and then for multiple ones.
A. Process Variable PMF Estimation Using Data From a Single Sensor
Consider the process variable V monitored by sensor S with data quality DQ. LetP n (V) be the estimate of P(V) based on n sensor measurements and DQ
and introduce the following recursive procedure for calculating h σ (n):
with initial conditions
In (30), h is either a small parameter
or a monotonically decreasing sequence, h = h (n), given by
As for the set point of (30), i.e., h * σ (s n+1 ), it is defined, based on the sensor believability (5), as follows:
Thus, the dynamical system (30)-(34) defines the evolution ofP n (V) based on sensor S measurements and its DQ. The limit of this evolution is characterized as follows:
Theorem 4.1: 1) Under Assumption (32), there exists 0 < 0 1, such that for all 0 < h < 0 , the recursive procedure (30), (31), and (34) converges in probability as n → ∞ to the following limit:
2) Under Assumption (33), convergence to the same limit takes place with probability 1.
Proof: See the Appendix. Thus, according to this theorem,P(V) depends not only on sensor S measurements, but also on DQ. Observe that if DQ is close to 1, the estimated PMF of V is close to the PMF of S, which is identical to what is postulated by classical statistics. However, if DQ is close to 0, the same measurements result in P(V) being practically uniform and independent of the sensor measurements. For all intermediate values of DQ,P(V) is an affine function of DQ.
The recursive procedure (30)-(34), referred to as the hprocedure, is the basis of the process variable assessment layer using data from a single sensor.
B. Process Variable PMF Estimation Using Data From Multiple Sensors
Consider process variable V monitored by two sensors, S 1 and S 2 , with data quality DQ 1 and DQ 2 , respectively. Let P S i (V), i ∈ {1, 2}, be the estimate of the PMF of V obtained from sensor S i measurements and the recursive procedure (30)-(32), (34)
The question addressed here is: How can one obtain an estimate of the PMF of V, based on the measurements of both sensors, S 1 and S 2 , simultaneously? To answer this question, we use the so-called Dempster-Shafer combination rule [24] . Namely, letP S 1 S 2 (V) denote the sought estimate
Then, according to the Dempster-Shafer rulê
Clearly, rule (37) can be used for more than two process variables (by combining all PMFs simultaneously and normalizing by their sum). Note that the entropy ofP S 1 S 2 (V) is not necessarily smaller than that ofP S 1 (V) andP S 2 (V). So, the PMF with the smallest of three entropies should be used in the plant assessment layer. (Note that the relationships between the entropies ofP σ ∈ , is calculated for each step, n ∈ N, according to (30), (31), and (34), and plotted in Fig. 2 . The PMF estimate converges to its steady state (35) in approximately 600 steps, where convergence is understood as
For a sensor whose sampling period is T S = 0.01 s, the corresponding time of convergence is approximately 6 s.
2) Process Variable PMF Estimation Using Data From Multiple Sensors:
Let process variable V be monitored by two sensors S 1 and S 2 . Further, let random variablesṼ and S i , i ∈ {1, 2}, describe the values taken by the process variable and sensor i. The range of values taken by these random variables and the regions in which they are viewed as L, N, and H, are the same as in Section III-E. In the first part of this example, a monotonic scenario is described, where the entropy ofP S 1 S 2 (V) is smaller than that ofP S 1 (V) andP S 2 (V). In the second part, a nonmonotonic case is presented. 
1) LetS
V. PLANT ASSESSMENT LAYER
A. Plant PMF Identification
The purpose of this layer is to estimate the PMF of G, i.e.,P(G), G ∈ G , using the process variable PMF estimates,P(V 1 ), . . . ,P(V M ), and either plant model,
With either of these models,P(G) is evaluated based on the Jeffrey rule [25] and the Dempster-Shafer rule, using the following procedure.
, assign the initial plant PMF as
2) Calculate the initial joint PMF of V i and G
3) Calculate the marginal probability
5) Marginalize (42) to obtain the plant PMF estimatê
6) If M > 1, combine the PMFs obtained in (43) using the Dempster-Shafer rule, as follows:
If the plant model is given as P(
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M}, and then follow steps (1)- (6).
B. Example
Consider the plant G, which consists of process variables V 1 and V 2 . Each process variable is monitored by one sensor, i.e., sensor S i monitors V i , i ∈ {1, 2}. The range of both process variables is [0, 10] , and the three regions are the same as in Section III-E. Also, sensor measurements are distributed as in the previous examples, with μS 
In this scenario, the process variable PMFs arê
Next, using Procedure (1)- (6) of the previous subsection, we obtain the following plant PMFs: In this example,P(G) turns out to have a lower entropy thanP V 1 (G) andP V 2 (G), indicating a monotonic case. In other examples, it might not be monotonic.
VI. SENSOR NETWORK ADAPTATION LAYER
This section describes the rational controller used for sensor network adaptation and investigates the resulting temporal properties of the adaptation.
A. Rational Controller
Rational controllers, introduced in [20] , are decision making devices that possess two properties: ergodicity and rationality. The ergodicity property implies that all states in the decision space are visited with a nonzero probability. The rationality property implies that the residence time in states with a smaller penalty function is larger than in those with a larger one. The degree to which this distinction takes place is referred to as the level of rationality.
In this paper, we use the rational controller defined by the following residence time in state x ∈ X:
where β > 0 is a small number (a design parameter), T max is the largest residence time (also a design parameter), and I x (G) is, as before, the entropy of the plant assessment PMF in sensor network state x, used here as the penalty function. The parameter N, in (47), is the level of rationality. Thus, this controller resides in states with small entropy for at most T max and less than that in other states. To ensure ergodicity, the rational controller, defined by (47), visits all states of the sensor network in a deterministic, round-robin manner.
Let τ x , defined as
be the relative residence time in state x ∈ X, and letP x (G) be the plant assessment PMF associated with this state. Then, the plant assessment PMF to be reported to the plant operator, is evaluated asP
The rational controller, described in this subsection and the PMFP(G) are used in Section VII for numerical performance evaluation of the resilient monitoring system designed in this paper.
B. Temporal Properties of Adaptation
From the temporal point of view, the adaptation layer consists of epochs; K epochs (where K is the number of states in the sensor network) comprise a cycle; at the end of each cycle,P(G) is reported to the plant operator.
For each x ∈ X, the epoch consists of three periods. 1) DQ evaluation period, T DQ .
2) Process variable(s) and plant PMF evaluation period, T eval . 3) Residence period in state x, T x . Assuming that the sensor measurements are provided every 0.01 s and using the procedure described in Section III, T DQ is of duration 5 s. Using the procedures described in Sections IV and V, duration of process variable and plant assessment, T eval , is about 6 s. The maximum residence period, T max , can be selected as desired. If T max is selected to be 1 s, the duration of each epoch is less than or equal to 12 s.
As mentioned above, K epochs constitute a cycle, wherein each of K states of the sensor network is visited. So, the cycle duration is, at most, 12K s. Thus, the resilient monitoring system provides the plant assessment PMF,P(G), within at most 12K s. Note that K = 2 N S , where N S is the number of sensors in the system; thus, the cycle duration grows exponentially with the number of sensors. This temporal organization is used in the next section to test the performance of the resilient monitoring system designed in this paper.
VII. APPLICATION TO RESILIENT MONITORING OF A SIMPLIFIED BOILER/TURBINE PLANT
Based on the results of previous sections, we describe here the performance evaluation of a resilient monitoring system for a specific plant, namely, a simplified boiler/turbine (B/T) plant. The model of this plant is described in Section VII-A. The resilient monitoring system is detailed in Section VII-B. System parameters are specified in Section VII-C. Finally, results of performance evaluation are presented in Section VII-D.
A. Model of the Boiler/Turbine Plant
Components, Process Variables, and Sensor Network: A schematic of the considered B/T plant is shown in Fig. 3 . It consists of the following components: boiler, fuel valve, turbine, turbine valve, condenser, and feedwater pump. The boiler, whose heat supply is regulated by the fuel valve, converts water into steam at a high pressure. The heat energy of the steam is converted into mechanical energy of the output shaft by the turbine. The turbine valve is used to regulate the amount of steam entering the turbine, and, hence, can be used to govern its speed. Steam at the turbine's output, which is at a low pressure, is passed through the condenser and converted back into water. The feedwater pump then pressurizes and recirculates this water into the boiler for the cycle to continue.
To simplify the exposition, we assume here that only the boiler and turbine may exhibit anomalous behavior, while all other components of Fig. 3 function normally; a similar development can be carried out when other components (e.g., the valves) are under an attack. Also, it is assumed that the state of the boiler is characterized by steam temperature (V 1 ) and the state of the turbine by its speed (V 2 ). These assumptions do not reduce generality, and the methods and techniques described in this section can be used for more complete B/T plant models as well.
As far as the sensor network is concerned, it is assumed that each process variable, V 1 and V 2 , is monitored by two sensors, S ij , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, where i and j index the process variable and sensor, respectively. Note that while the assumption of redundant sensors does not restrict the generality, it is used here to illustrate how the data of multiple sensors can be combined. Moreover, the efficacy of resilient monitoring in redundant and nonredundant sensor cases remains, in a sense, the same. For instance, if all sensors of a process variable are attacked in the redundant case, the resulting monitoring performance is the same as in the nonredundant case under a similar attack on its sensor. 
respectively. The PMF of V 1 can be calculated using fṼ
min , V B max , and R B as in (1) . Let the random variableṼ 2 characterize the turbine speed. The PDF and range ofṼ 2 are specified by fṼ 2 (ṽ 2 ) and
respectively. As before, let the discrete random variable V 2 characterize the state of V 2 . To define the state space of V 2 , we take into consideration the serial connection between the boiler temperature and turbine speed, which implies that the status of the former affects that of the latter. Accordingly, the universal set of V 2 is specified as
where VL T (Very Low) occurs when both the boiler and turbine are damaged; L 1T when only the boiler is damaged; L 2T when only the turbine is damaged; and N T when neither boiler nor turbine are damaged. The regions that designate the states of V 2 are given by
The PMF of V 2 can be calculated using fṼ
, as in (1). 2) Coupling: As follows from above, the main distinction of the B/T system in comparison with the examples of Sections III-VI is that process variables in the former are not independent. This implies that the state of one could be deduced from the state of the other. We formalize this coupling by conditional probabilities P(V 1 |V 2 ) and P(V 2 |V 1 )
which are used for the evaluation of, say, the boiler state, even if all its sensors are under attack, using the sensor of the turbine (see Scenarios 3 and 4 in Section VII-D for details).
3) Plant Model, Plant States, and Anomalies:
The plant model is assumed to be given by the joint conditional PMF P(V 1 , V 2 |G), where G is a discrete random variable representing the state of the plant, which can be either Normal (N G ) or Anomalous. The following anomalies are considered. 1) A 1G : the temperature of the boiler is low due to a rupture in its structure, while the turbine is not damaged. Since the temperature of steam supplied to the turbine is reduced, its speed drops, specifically, to the values described by L 1T . Hence, this anomaly is characterized by
2) A 2G : the speed of the turbine is lower than normal due to damage in its blades. The boiler is functioning normally, which leads to the turbine speed taking values lower than normal but higher than under L 1T . Hence, this anomaly is characterized by
3) A 3G : both the boiler and turbine are damaged. Obviously, the turbine speed is lower than in anomalies A 1G and A 2G . The resulting states of the boiler temperature and turbine speed that characterize this anomaly are
Thus, the universal set of G is given by
4) Probing Procedure, Probing Signals, and Process Variable DC Gains:
In general, all components of the B/T plant operate in a feedback regime. For example, the speed of the turbine is feedback regulated using the turbine valve as an actuator. Similarly, the steam temperature in the boiler is feedback controlled using the fuel valve. However, if a controller calculates control signals based on measurements of a captured sensor, undesirable, if not catastrophic, outcomes may ensue. For instance, if the turbine speed sensor is captured and is forced to indicate Low, the controller would further open the turbine valve and increase the speed, possibly causing irreversible damage to the turbine. Similarly, a captured sensor of the boiler can project low temperature, leading to a possibly catastrophic temperature rise caused by an erroneous control action. Therefore, under conditions of attack, feedback should be used cautiously, i.e., when it is indeed ascertained that a sensor is not compromised. Since a priori it is not known that the DQ of a sensor is high, we consider the following procedure: 1) disable feedback; 2) using probing signals, identify sensor DQs; 3) using sensor measurements and DQ, compute plant PMF and report it to the operator; and 4) if DQs are sufficiently high, enable feedback; otherwise, do not. Then, this procedure is repeated periodically.
We recognize that disabling feedback control loops associated with the boiler and turbine may be unacceptable in practice. Nevertheless, the goal here is to illustrate the active probing procedure for computing sensor DQ, with the understanding that acceptable practical probing strategies can be developed for most applications.
As far as the probing signals are concerned, the boiler temperature, V 1 , is probed by the fuel valve. Similarly, the probing test of turbine speed, V 2 , is accomplished using the turbine valve. To ensure that the change in turbine speed does not result in a substantial change in the frequency of the generator's voltage, the magnitude of the probe is kept sufficiently small.
The 
, and α T N , are related
Thus, the B/T model is characterized by the PDFs ofṼ 1 andṼ 2 , PMFs of G, V 1 , and V 2 , the conditional probabil-
, and α T N .
B. Resilient Monitoring System of the B/T Plant
The architecture of this system is shown in Fig. 1 . The calculations at each of its layers are briefly summarized below.
1) Data Quality Assessment Layer:
Each process variable is probed by a rectangular signal, (21) , and sensor DQs are calculated according to the procedure defined in (22)-(28). Taking into account the serial connection between the process variables, a question arises: how can one ensure that the probing test of a given process variable does not affect that of the other? This issue is addressed (in the sensor network adaptation layer) by increasing the DQ evaluation period for appropriate epochs, so that each process variable can be probed independently.
2) Process Variable Assessment Layer: For the B/T plant under consideration, process variable PMFs are evaluated using three methods. While the first one is based directly on the h-procedure of Section IV, two others use, in addition, the coupling (56). These three methods are as follows.
1) Assume that sensor S 1 , with data quality DQ 1 , monitors process variable V 1 . Then the PMFP S 1 (
, can be evaluated by assigning sensor believability and set points as in (7) and (8), respectively, and applying the h-procedure, detailed in Section IV-A. Using the same methodology, one can also obtainP S 2 (V 2 = σ 2 ), σ 2 ∈ 2 [see (54)]. 2) Assume again that sensor S 1 , with data quality DQ 1 , monitors process variable V 1 . Using this sensor and the conditional probability P(V 2 |V 1 ), the PMF of V 2 can be evaluated using the total probability formula as follows:
whereP S 1 (V 1 ) is identified using the method of 1. Similarly, the PMF of V 1 can be evaluated using the PMF of V 2 and P(V 1 |V 2 ).
3) Assume that sensor S 1 , with data quality DQ 1 , monitors process variable V 1 and sensor S 2 , with data quality DQ 2 , monitors process variable V 2 . Then the PMF of V 1 based on the sensors S 1 and S 2 can be evaluated using the Dempster-Shafer rule as follows:
are identified using the methods of 1 and 2, respectively. The PMFP S 1 S 2 (V 2 = σ 2 ), σ 2 ∈ 2 , can be calculated in a similar manner.
Each of these methods is used in the process variable assessment layer of the B/T monitoring system analyzed in this section.
3) Plant Condition Assessment Layer: Using the process variable PMFs and model P(V 1 , V 2 |G), the plant assessment PMF,P(G), is calculated by applying the procedure described in Section V.
4) Sensor Network Adaptation Layer: As mentioned above, each process variable of the B/T plant is monitored by two sensors, i.e., S 11 and S 12 monitor V 1 , while sensors S 21 and
The rational controller, given by (47), adapts the sensor network according to the entropy of the plant assessment PMF in each state x ∈ X of the sensor network. All other parameters are the same as in Section VI, with the only exception that the DQ evaluation period, T DQ , is modified based on the argument mentioned at the beginning of this subsection. To account for this, T DQ in sensor network states associated with two process variables is assumed to be twice larger than in states associated with a single process variable. , being sufficiently small so that realizations of V i outside the specified intervals can be ignored.
C. System Parameters
The sensor measurements are characterized by the random variableS ij , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, whose distribution is specified by N μS ij , σS ij . The sampling period of all sensors is assumed to be T S = 0.01 s.
The DC gains of the process variables are as follows: α Regarding the h-procedure, the parameter h is taken as 0.01, and the stopping rule is given by (38).
The plant model, P(V 1 , V 2 |G), is assumed to be as follows. In all the scenarios considered below, the plant assessment PMF,P(G) [see (18) ], is expressed as the row vector [
, and is reported to the plant operator, in compliance with the temporal properties of Section VI-B, approximately every 210 s.
D. Performance Evaluation of the Resilient Monitoring System
This subsection presents results of numerical performance evaluation of the B/T monitoring system specified above.
1) Scenario 1:
The boiler operates normally and the blades of the turbine are damaged, resulting in a reduction of speed, i.e., the plant is in state A 2G . The statistics of the process variables is assumed to be characterized by μṼ The resulting performance of the monitoring system is illustrated in Fig. 4 , which provides the relative residence time, τ x , in each state, x, of the sensor network. Clearly, the rational controller resides longer in states of the sensor network where the nonattacked turbine sensor is active. The plant assessment PMF,P(G), is [0.0664, 0.0043, 0.9257, 0.0036], which indicates that the plant is, indeed, in the state A 2G .
The nonresilient system reports the plant assessment PMF P nr (G) ≈ [0.5, 0, 0.5, 0]. This leads to the measure of resiliency MR = 0.89, which testifies to the efficacy of the resilient monitoring system.
2) Scenario 2:
The plant is in state A 3G due to the damage of both the boiler and turbine. The statistics of the process variables is assumed to be characterized by μṼ The resulting performance of the monitoring system is illustrated in Fig. 6 . Clearly, the residence time is large in the sensor network states where the measurements of the turbine sensors are taken into account. The plant assessment PMF, P(G), is [0.005, 0.951, 0.004, 0.04], which indicates that the plant is, indeed, in the state A 1G . This accurate plant evaluation is obtained, despite having both boiler sensors captured, due to the utilization of the conditional probability, P(V 1 |V 2 ), described in (56).
The nonresilient system evaluates the plant PMF aŝ The resulting performance of the monitoring system is illustrated in Fig. 7 . Obviously, the residence time is larger in those sensor network states wherein the measurements of the nonattacked sensor are taken into account. The plant assessment PMF,P(G), is [0.05, 0.454, 0.05, 0.446], indicating that the plant is either in A 1G or A 3G . This is reasonable because only the boiler temperature is known from trustworthy measurements.
The nonresilient system obtains the plant PMF P nr (G) = [0.38, 0.38, 0.21, 0.03], which erroneously reports that the probability of the plant state being A 3G is quite low. In this scenario, the measure of resiliency is MR = 0.76.
A question arises as to whyP nr (G = A 2G ) is relatively large, given that only one sensor, S 11 , indicates this plant state. This phenomenon can be explained as a manifestation of the Zadeh counterexample (see [26] ), which is as follows: let random variable V ∈ {L, N, H} describe the state of a process variable, and let P 1 (V) = [0.95, 0.05, 0] and P 2 (V) = [0, 0.05, 0.95] be two candidate PMFs indicating low and high, respectively. Further, a third PMF, P 12 (V) = [0, 1, 0], is obtained using Dempster-Shafer rule. The PMF, P 12 (V), implies that the process variable is normal, which is paradoxical since both P 1 (V) and P 2 (V) indicate this state with a very small probability. The relatively large value ofP nr (G = A 2G ), in Scenario 4, is precisely due to this reason, and is testified by the PMFsP The resulting performance of the monitoring system is illustrated in Fig. 8 . Clearly, the rational controller resides longer in states of the sensor network where the boiler sensors are active. The plant assessment PMF,P(G), is [0.48, 0.02, 0.49, 0.01], which indicates that the plant is either in N G or A 2G . The uncertainty of this assessment is due to the lack of trustworthy information about the turbine speed.
The nonresilient system reports the plant assessment PMF P nr (G) ≈ [0.05, 0, 0.95, 0], which leads to the measure of resiliency MR = 0.76. The plant assessment PMF in each state of the sensor network is roughly uniform, which results in the residence times being approximately equal. The plant PMF reported to the operator isP(G) = [0.2539, 0.2491, 0.2515, 0.2455], which is reasonable due to the fact that all sensors are captured.
The nonresilient system evaluates the plant PMF aŝ P nr (G) ≈ [1, 0, 0, 0]. The measure of resiliency, MR, is calculated as 0.7515, which, once again, testifies to the efficacy of the resilient monitoring system developed in this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper provides methods for designing resilient monitoring systems. The development is carried out in a modeling environment, where each process variable may be either normal or anomalous, and the attacker shifts the expected value of sensor measurements so as to misrepresent the real status of the process variable. In this scenario, we provide methods for:
1) assessing the data quality of a sensor (using probing signals); 2) assessing the status of a process variable (using sensor measurements and its data quality as the inputs to the so-called h-procedure); 3) assessing the status of the monitored plant (using the Jeffrey's rule applied to process variable PMFs); 4) adapting the sensor network to its optimal state, which leads to the plant assessment with the smallest entropy (using rational controllers). In addition, we apply these methods to monitor a boiler/turbine system and show that the resulting monitoring system is indeed resilient (as quantified by the KullbackLeibler divergence) under various attack scenarios.
Numerous problems, however, remain open. Some of them are as follows.
1) Improving models of process variables, plant, and the attacker by making them more general and practical. For example, attackers other than mean-based should be introduced and analyzed. 2) Developing novel methods of active data quality assessment, which would be more effective and simpler than the probing technique introduced in this paper. 3) Improving the speed of convergence to the desirable sensor network state. This may be accomplished by using recursive versions of process variable and plant assessment estimates. 4) Developing novel types of rational controllers that would lead to faster network adaptation. 5) Fighting the curse of dimensionality, which arises in systems with large number of sensors. An approach to combating this problem could be based on decomposition of the overall sensor network into smaller subsystems and adapting each of them separately. 6) Most importantly, practical application of resilient monitoring systems is a challenging task for future research. Solutions to these problems will lead to a relatively complete and useful theory of resilient monitoring systems.
